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FEMALE INCOME, THE EGO EFFECT AND THE DIVORCE DECISION: 
EVIDENCE FROM MICRO DATA ABSTRACT 
 
During the 1960’s and 1970’s divorce rates in the United States rose dramatically. It soon became 
apparent that this phenomenon was not restricted to the geographic boundaries of the United 
States but affected most developed countries to varying degrees. This surprising social change led to 
rapid growth in the number of academic investigations seeking to quantify the causes and 
consequences of divorce. While there are undoubtedly many factors affecting the decision to 
dissolve a marriage, this research concentrates on three economic arguments that have persisted 
through the years.  All three relate to the female’s ability to generate income in the labour market. 
The first argues that as the female increases her ability to generate income, she becomes financially 
more independent thereby making divorce more likely. The second argument contends that, as 
female earnings become a larger share of family income, marital friction results and the likelihood of 
divorce increases.  Finally, it has also been argued that the family unit places a high value on the 
ability of the married female to earn income and, therefore, strives harder to avoid divorce as the 
female’s ability to earn income rises. The difficulty with quantifying these arguments is the very 
nature of the observable outcomes.  It is possible to observe the income of married females.  It is 
also possible to observe the income of divorced females. Unfortunately, it is not possible to 
simultaneously observe both outcomes for an individual female. This research attempts to resolve 
these difficulties by using micro data from the Current Population Survey in a sample selection 
procedure to estimate both income contingent on divorce and income contingent on marriage. This 
information is then used in a final “structural” procedure to test the validity of the income 
arguments. The statistical results indicate that the first two arguments clearly outweigh the third. TABLE OF CONTENTS 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
During the 1960’s and 1970’s divorce rates in the United States rose dramatically.  This surprising 
increase led to rapid growth in the number of academic investigations seeking to quantify the causes 
and consequences of divorce.  It soon became clear that the divorce phenomenon was not 
restricted to the geographic boundaries of the United States.  Other industrialized countries, most 
specifically Great Britain, experienced similar if not identical tendencies to terminate marriages at 
previously unheard of rates.   Even though divorce rates have stabilized in recent decades, the 
search for improved models of the divorce decision has persisted in a relatively unabated fashion. 
The reason for this is, undoubtedly, the fact that even though divorce rates stabilized they did so at 
a very high rate—50 percent [Kreider and Fields, p. 18]. 
This research specifically focuses on the economic causes of divorce.  However, there can be little 
doubt that there are many other factors involved in the decision to dissolve a marriage.  For 
example, demographic factors like changes in the population’s age structure contribute to changes in 
expected divorce rates.  In developed countries where life expectancies have significantly increased, 
the opportunity for lengthier marriages has also increased.  As a natural consequence of a lengthier 
marriage, the number of divorces would be expected to rise.  Development of improved 
contraceptives and easier access to them has reduced the number of children, thus decreasing the 
transaction cost to obtaining a divorce.  The costliness of children is well known and when a 
marriage dissolves, the children become an even larger economic burden.  Offsetting this burden to 
a certain degree is the more extensive safety net provided by developed economies.  In addition, 
regime changes like the emergence of no-fault divorce laws have reduced the transaction cost of 
litigation, and by doing so have increased the likelihood of divorce.  Finally, one cannot ignore the 
personal aspect of the decision to end a marriage.  Rapid and extensive societal changes can lead to 
marriage ending frictions that in other circumstances might well be ignored.  
Although the factors mentioned above are clearly of importance, this research concentrates on 
three economic arguments that have persisted over the years.  All three relate to the female’s ability 
to generate income in the labour market.   The first argues that as the female increases her ability to 
generate income, she becomes financially more independent thereby making divorce more likely.  
Inextricably tied to this argument is the relative cost of child bearing.  As a female’s connection to 
the labour force strengthens, it increases the transaction cost of child rearing.  As a logical 
consequence, having fewer children reduces the transaction cost of divorce.  So, by strengthening 
ties to the labour force, the female invariably weakens ties to the family.  The second argument 
contends that, as female earnings become a larger share of family income, marital friction results and 
the likelihood of divorce increases.  Finally, it has also been argued that the family unit places a high 
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value on the ability of the married female to earn income and, therefore, strives harder to avoid 
divorce as the female’s ability to earn income rises. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds in five additional parts.  The next section of the paper 
provides a short literature review.  It examines both some of the theoretical and some of the 
previous empirical work dealing with the economic issues of divorce.  Part III provides a brief 
explanation of the statistical model used to accomplish the estimations.  Part IV describes the data 
used in the estimations.  Part V discusses the empirical results and, finally, some conclusions and 
caveats are offered in Part VI. 
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1  THEORETICAL MODELS 
In their seminal work on marital instability, Becker, Landes, and Michael [1977] argue that the 
decision to divorce compares the value of being single to the joint value of being married.  Following 
the modelling work of Weiss [1996], let 
MF
tt t t G(X , X , K ,  ) θ  be the household production function 
that measures the joint value of staying married.  This joint valuation is a function of the 
characteristics of both spouses,   for the male and   for the female.  The characteristics   
and   include the earnings of each respective spouse.  The production function also includes Kt, 
which measures marriage-specific capital such as children.  The final argument in the production 
function, θt, is an unobservable measure of the quality of the relationship.  All the arguments of the 
production function have a subscript “t” to denote a particular time period.  The value of these 









Let the post-divorce value of being single equal   for the male and   for the female.  Among 
other things, these variables include each spouse’s estimate of the option value of remarriage, a 
possibility that occurs only after the current marriage is dissolved.  The transactions cost to 
obtaining a divorce, Ct, not only includes legal expenses, but it also captures the opportunity cost of 






Divorce occurs when the sum of the values of becoming single, minus the transaction cost of the 
divorce, is greater than the joint value of remaining married.  Using the terms defined above, divorce 
is optimal when 
MF M F
tt t t t t t A +  A  -  C  >  G ( X,  X ,  K ,  θ ) .  
Of primary interest to this research are the theoretical inferences about income.  For example, an 
increase in female labour force participation increases female income, which, in turn, increases   
and makes divorce more likely.  Higher female salaries increase the opportunity cost of children, 
reduce Kt, and increase the likelihood of marriage dissolution.  Also, higher female salaries threaten 
male egos, leading to marital stress that reduces θt, the quality of the relationship, and increases the 
probability of divorce.   
F
t A
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2.2  EMPIRICAL LITERATURE 
Various empirical studies of divorce in the United States have used a wide assortment of techniques, 
variables and data to produce results that often appear contradictory and, sometimes even, 
counterintuitive. In explaining the decision to divorce, cross-sectional, micro-level econometric 
studies have used independent variables such as marriage tenure; working status of the female; the 
husband’s earnings, age, and educational level; the wife’s earnings, age, and educational level; the 
number and age of children; and the occurrence of a previous divorce.  Time-series analyses of a 
country’s divorce rate have used macroeconomic variables such as the unemployment rate, the 
inflation rate and the rate of growth in real GDP to explain changes in the divorce rate. 
Micro, cross-sectional studies 
Lombardo [1999], and Greene and Quester [1982] argue that wives facing a higher risk of divorce 
will hedge against that risk with higher levels of labour force participation, and that they will also 
respond by working longer hours.  The basic argument made in these papers is that investment in 
nonmarket activities, such as child rearing, becomes relatively less attractive (it yields a lower 
expected return), and investment in human capital becomes relatively more attractive (it yields a 
higher expected return) as the probability of divorce increases.  Studies by Johnson and Skinner 
[1986], and Shapiro and Shaw [1983] provide additional evidence for the above argument by finding 
that women increase their labour force participation prior to dissolution of a marriage.  The above 
papers make a clear causality argument that an increase in the likelihood of divorce increases a 
female’s willingness to enter the labour force.   
Spitze and South in two separate studies [1985, 1986] argue a different line of causality.  Their 
conclusion is that an increase in female labour force participation leads to an increase in familial 
conflict and, consequently, an increase in divorce.  Substantiating evidence for this view is provided 
by Mincer [1985].   In a survey of twelve industrialized nations he found that rising divorce rates 
clearly lag rising female labour force participation rates. 
Previous studies of the impact of income on divorce have provided mixed results.  Becker, Landes, 
and Michael [1977] find that a rise in expected female earnings increases the probability of divorce, 
while a rise in expected male earnings reduces the probability of divorce. D’amico [1983] recognizes 
two distinctly different possible effects of income on divorce.  One hypothesis is that as the female’s 
wage relative to the male’s rises, conflict based on competition for status within the marriage will 
occur and will increase the likelihood of divorce.  The second, opposing hypothesis is the notion 
that the pursuit of higher socio-economic status is a familial one and that a wife earning a relatively 
higher wage than that of the husband may contribute to the overall status goal and solidify the 
marriage.  D’amico’s results tend to confirm the latter hypothesis.  Finally, Hoffman and Duncan 
[1995] find no support for the hypothesis that higher real female wages lead to increased divorce 
rates and a study by Sayer and Bianchi [2000] tends to confirm this finding. 
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However, Spitze and South raise another question that is closely related to the income issue.  In a 
1985 study, they produce evidence that the number of hours a wife works has a greater impact on 
the probability of divorce than do various measures of the wife’s income. 
Macro, time-series studies  
In an empirical study of the growth of divorce rates in Great Britain, Smith (1997) finds no evidence 
that marriage dissolution increases because of the introduction of no-fault divorce laws.  He argues 
that, rather than being the vehicle of change, these types of legal modifications merely codify, react 
to, and regulate ongoing social and economic transformations.  Smith finds that procedural and legal 
changes do have a powerful, albeit temporary impact.  One procedural change that did increase the 
number of divorces was revised court settlement rules that reduced transactions costs and 
improved the financial position of females post divorce.  Smith attributes the increased number of 
divorces in Great Britain to rising female labour force participation, higher female income and the 
subsequent reduction in the female’s economic dependency on marriage.  In addition, technological 
change giving females greater control over fertility has had a significant impact.  With improved 
fertility control resulting in fewer children, a significant transaction cost of divorce has been 
effectively reduced.    
South [1985] finds little evidence that the divorce rate rises during periods of recession and falls 
during periods of expansion.  He does find a positive, albeit small, effect of unemployment on the 
divorce rate.  His model indicates that changes in the age structure and the labour force 
participation rate of women have significantly stronger impacts on the divorce rate than other 
macroeconomic variables. 
Using a simple vector autoregressive (VAR) approach with macro, time-series data, Bremmer and 
Kesselring [1999] show that the female labour force participation rate does not Granger cause 
divorce rates.  However, they do provide statistical evidence that divorce rates Granger cause 
female participation in the labour force.  They also show that past participation in the labour market 
influences women salaries. 
In another time-series study using macro data, Bremmer and Kesselring (2003) use co integration 
techniques to investigate the relationship between divorce, female labour force participation, and 
median female income.  Though these variables had unit roots, their first differences were 
stationary, and these variables were shown to be co integrated.  Impulse functions from this model 
reveal that an increase in divorce leads to a rise in female labour force participation; but positive 
innovations to female labour force participation imply a decline in the divorce rate.  Impulse function 
analysis also shows that a positive innovation to median female income leads to increased divorce 
and increased labour force participation on the part of females. 
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3 THE STATISTICAL MODEL 
 
The most pervasive thread tying the above literature together is the relationship between female 
earning capacity and its relationship to divorce.  This argument takes several important forms.  First 
is a line of reasoning that developed during the 1970’s and 1980’s when females experienced a 
substantial increase in their ability to successfully participate in the labour market.  Unquestionably, 
female labour force participation increased during this time and, along with this increase came 
improved salaries and benefits.   Consequently, academics argued that as females developed better 
access to income outside the marriage the likelihood of divorce increased.  While this idea was 
written about in many ways it proved difficult to quantify.  It also led to counter arguments that 
when a married female’s value in the labour market increased it might well strengthen a marriage 
and reduce the probability of divorce.  The difficulty with quantifying these arguments is the very 
nature of the observable outcomes.  It is possible to observe the income of married females.  It is 
also possible to observe the income of divorced females.  Unfortunately, it is not possible to 
simultaneously observe both outcomes for an individual female.  So, while the data may indicate that 
divorced females participate in the labour force at substantially higher rates than married females, it 
provides no valid evidence that ready access to the labour market is a causal factor in divorce.  In 
other words, this is a classic sample selection problem. 
  Over the years, academics of various disciplines began to develop another income related 
argument that they hoped would explain the increasing occurrence of divorce.  As a married 
female’s contribution to household income grows, it gives her more say in the conduct of the 
marriage.  So, conflict within the marriage is given an opportunity to flourish.  Disagreements about 
the way that money is spent and, for that matter, disagreements over the conduct of everyday 
household responsibilities become much more likely.  However, the sample selection problem arises 
again.  It is possible to observe the amount that married females contribute to the household but it 
is not possible to directly observe the amount that a divorced female would have contributed to the 
household had she remained married.  Consequently, econometric techniques accounting for these 
difficulties are required. 
  A typical statistical approach to solving the above problems begins by specifying a selection 
equation.  For example, the selection equation for the divorce problem would be: 
*'
ii Du =+ γ w i  
where   represents a vector of variables that predict the likelihood of divorce.  In this case (as in 















    
In order to test the above hypotheses regarding divorce, three different income equations need to 
be estimated.   So, there are three equations that will make similar (though not identical) use of the 
information from the selection equation.  The three equations are: 
[] EP Yd i v o r c e d  
[] E PY married  
  [] E FY married  
where PY stands for personal earnings and FY stands for family income. 
The estimation technique used for all three is very similar.  So, model development proceeds by 
using the first equation as an example.  The usual equation that one is interested in estimating is: 
'
ii PY ε =+ i βx   
where   is the vector of independent variables used to predict  .  Unfortunately,   is only 
observed when  =1.  Also, for this derivation the standard assumptions are made about 
i x PY i PY
i D i ε  and 
.  In other words, they have a bivariate normal distribution with zero means and a correlation of 
ρ. 
i u
What one truly wishes to estimate is: 
* [] [ ii i i E PY PY is observed E PY D => 0 ]  
which is equivalent to : 
  [] [ ii i i i E PY PY is observed E PY D == x , 1 ] . 
Incorporation of the selection equation results in the above equation yields: 
*' [] [ 0 ] [ ii i i i i i E PY PY is observed E PY D E PY u => = > ] γ w  
'' [] [ ii i i i i E PY PY is observed E u ε =+ > − βx ] γ w  
                                                   
' () ii ε u ρσλα =+ βx  
                                                   
' () ii λ u β λα =+ βx  
where: 
'' /a n d ( ) (/ ) / (/ =− = Φ u iu u iu iu
' ) α σλ α φ σ γ w γ w γ w σ .  The equation in estimable 
form becomes: 
' [] ii i i u E PY PY is observed v λ βλα =+ + βx ( ) i
                                                
.1
 
1   For a very good explanation of this technique see Greene [2000].  
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Consequently, application of OLS to the model results in two problems.  First, omitting 
λ (commonly referred to as the inverse Mills ratio) creates a bias similar to that attributed to an 
omitted variable and, second, the disturbance term, , is heteroscedastic.  As a result, estimation 
proceeds in a two-step manner.  First, following the methodology recommended by Heckman 




for each observation.  Then, β is 
estimated by regressing   on   and  PY x ˆ λ .  Finally, the correction for heteroscedasticity 
recommended by Greene [1981] is applied to the estimates.  By following similar logic and making 
minor adjustments, the estimates for all three of the equations can be obtained. 
In order to test the hypotheses specified earlier, an additional step must be taken.  It is necessary to 
use the estimated coefficients obtained from the least squares regressions to produce expected 
values (observations) for every individual (both married and divorced) in the data set [Lee, 1978].  
Once these observations have been obtained, the necessary relationships can be calculated. 
  The created variable used to test the first hypothesis is: 
  1 ˆ [] [ E PY married E PY divorced ∆= − ] . 
Smaller values for   indicate that the female is better equipped to enter the labour force and, 
consequently, better prepared to live independently.   If a female were the only participant in the 
marriage, it would make sense to argue that as 
1 ˆ ∆
1 ˆ ∆  declines the likelihood of divorce would definitely 
increase.  However, the male is also a participant in the marriage and while his interaction in the 
process has not been written about as frequently as the female’s, it should (might?) be just as 
important.  If the male values the possible economic contribution of the female to the family’s 
economic welfare, he would have an increasing preference to remain married as   declines and 
should, therefore, seek to reduce the likelihood of divorce.   
1 ˆ ∆
The other variable of interest is created in the following manner: 
  2 ˆ [] [] EF Ym a r r i e d EP Ym a r r i e d ∆= − . 
As   declines, the percentage of total family income accounted for by female earnings increases.  
Some authors have argued that this increasing share of income on the part of the female can cause 
friction within the marriage and, consequently, lead to a greater likelihood of divorce.  Others have 
argued that the female’s contribution could be highly valued by the other family members and 
should, therefore, reduce the likelihood of divorce.  So, the question of whether   or   has a 
positive or negative impact on divorce becomes an empirical issue. 
2 ˆ ∆
2 ˆ ∆ 1 ˆ ∆
The following equation was formulated to provide a statistical test of these issues: 
12 ˆˆ (, , ) . D f state of residence =∆ ∆      
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where, as before,  stands for divorce.  This equation, estimated by a probit procedure, has been 
referred to in the literature as a structural equation [see Lee] because it includes the specific 
variables hypothesized to predict the binary outcome.  In this particular case, the series of dummy 
variables representing the fifty different states is included in the equation because each state has 
different laws regarding marriage and divorce.  Plus, there are still cultural and social factors at work 
in the different states that could lead to varying divorce outcomes. 
D
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4 THE DATA 
 
Most of the variables were taken from the March Supplement (Annual Demographic File) of the 
Current Population Survey.  The complete surveys for the years 1990, 1995 and 2000 were 
obtained from the web site maintained by the National Bureau of Economic Research.  State per 
capita income was obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis web site under the heading of 
State and Local Personal Income.  Finally, the Consumer Price Index for 1990, 1995 and 2000 came 
from the Bureau of Labour Statistics.  The names and definitions of all of the variables are provided 
in Table 1. 
The statistical procedures required observations for married females and for divorced females.   
Application of these restrictions to the data set resulted in 112,740 usable observations.  Of this 
total, 16,760 represented divorced females and 95,980 represented married females.   
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5 THE STATISTICAL ESTIMATIONS 
 
Table 2 provides the results from the probit procedure that was applied to the divorce selection 
equation.  All variables used in the various estimation procedures were included in this equation.  
This is the usual procedure for estimations of this type because any variable that affects income 
should also have an effect on the occurrence of divorce.  A criticism that has been directed at 
models of this type is that unless variables in the selection equation can, reasonably, be excluded 
from the other equations, results can be unreliable (See Vella, 1998).  Fortunately, this formulation 
of the model provides an entire set of variables that can reasonably be excluded from the income 
equations—the series of state dummy variables.  The state dummies are included in the selection 
equation to account for differences in state laws and socio-economic conditions that, theoretically, 
should affect the decision to obtain a divorce.  They are excluded from the income equations in 
favour of state per-capita income.  This variable is included in the income equations to account for 
variation in labour market conditions on a geographical basis. 
Due to the rather large number of variables included in the estimation procedure, the coefficients 
for the state dummy variables (S_), the occupational dummy variables (OC_) and the industry 
dummy variables (IN_) are omitted.2  Of the 34 variables listed in Table 2, 28 are significant at the 1 
percent or 5 percent level.  Most of the variables behaved in predictable ways.  For the most part, if 
the female in question had migrated within the U.S. during the previous year (MIG_), the probability 
of being divorced was significantly higher.   On the other hand, if the migration was from abroad 
(MIG_ABM, MIG_ABN), the probability of divorce significantly decreased.  While the results for the 
education dummies (ED_) provided some mixed evidence, generally, they indicated that having a 
lower level of education increases the likelihood of divorce.  As family size increases the likelihood 
of divorce significantly declines and being of Asian descent also reduces the likelihood of divorce.  
Of course the primary purpose of this equation is not for statistical inference, but for use in 
estimating the earnings equations. 
Table 3 provides the results for the selection corrected estimation of divorced female personal 
earnings.  The coefficients and t-scores for the thirteen occupation dummies and the fourteen 
industry dummies that were included in the estimation are not displayed.3  The education variables 
reveal no significance until the equivalent of a bachelor’s degree is attained.  Then the coefficients 
increase in size and significance as education rises.  The estimated coefficients for the migration 
variables are negative  (with one exception) and both of the coefficients that are significantly 
different from zero are negative.  Not surprisingly, the coefficient on being a federal worker is 
                                                  
2   Full results will be supplied on request. 
3   Full results will be supplied on request. 
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significantly positive while the coefficients on being either a state or a local government worker are 
significantly negative.4  Being a member of the labour force significantly increases earnings whether 
the participant is employed or unemployed.  Of the ethnic variables, only the coefficient on being 
Hispanic is significantly different from 0 (at the 10% level of significance) and it is negative.  It is a 
little surprising that coefficient for age is negative and significant.  However, the rest of the variables 
behave in expected ways.  As the number of children in the household increase (Under18), earnings 
significantly decline.  There is also a significant negative relationship between self-employment and 
earnings.  On the other hand, living in a metropolitan statistical area, purchasing a home, increasing 
levels of state per capita income, and increasing family size all significantly increase earnings.  Finally, 
for this equation, the estimated coefficient for the selection variable (lambda) is negative and 
significant.  The adjusted R-squared for this equation is 0.47 which is a very respectable showing 
considering that most of the variables used in the equation are binary. 
Table 4 presents the estimation results for the selection corrected equation predicting personal 
earnings for married females.  Once again the coefficients and t-scores for the thirteen occupation 
dummies and the fourteen industry dummies that were included in the estimation are not reported.5  
The results for this equation are very similar to those for the divorced earnings equation.  Education 
doesn’t have a significantly positive affect on earnings until a bachelor’s degree is obtained at which 
point it has a large impact.  Graduate education has an even greater positive effect.  Of the six 
migration variables, only three have significant coefficients and they are all negative.  Once again, 
working for the federal government has a significant and positive impact on earnings, as does 
participation in the labour force whether employed or not.  The estimated coefficients for the 
ethnic dummies vary considerably from the divorced equation.  The coefficients for being African 
American and Asian are both positive and significantly different from zero at the one percent level.  
However, the coefficients on being Hispanic or Indian are not significantly different from zero.   
Once again, age has a significant and negative effect on earnings.  The number of children in the 
household and self-employment both reduce income while living in an MSA, buying a home, having a 
larger family size, and living in a higher income state all significantly increase earnings.  The estimated 
coefficient for lambda (the selection variable) is negative and significant.  Finally, the adjusted R-
squared is 0.48. 
Table 5 presents the selection corrected results for the equation predicting family income.  The 
coefficients and t-scores for the thirteen occupation dummies and the fourteen industry dummies 
that were included in the estimation are not reported.6  The education variables behave in the 
expected fashion (very similar to the personal earnings equations) with increasing levels of education 
                                                  
4   Stanley and Jarrell (1998, p. 963) in their meta-regression on gender wage discrimination point to the importance of job 
classification variables that specify governmental employment in the estimation of female earnings. 
5   Full results will be supplied on request 
6   Full results will be supplied on request 
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producing higher levels of income once the high school graduate stage is reached.   The migration 
variables also behave very similarly to the way they behave in the personal earnings equation with a 
recent migration (within the previous year) resulting in reduced income.  The labour force 
participation variables behave quite differently.  If the female is employed it has a positive and 
significant impact on family income, but if the female is unemployed there is a negative and significant 
impact on family income.  The ethnic variables also behave very differently in this estimation.  The 
estimated coefficients for Black, Indian and Hispanic are all negative and significant.   The coefficient 
for Asian is insignificant.  Increasing numbers of children and age significantly decrease family income.  
Living in an MSA, being self-employed, buying a home, increasing family size, and living in a state with 
a higher per capita income all significantly increase family income.  The estimated coefficient for the 
selection variable (lambda) is negative and significant.  Finally, the adjusted R-squared is 0.38. 
Of course, the final probit provides the most intriguing results and they are provided in Table 6.  
Both of the created difference variables ( 1 ˆ ∆  and  2 ˆ ∆ ) have negative and significant estimated 
coefficients.  The result for   indicates that as females become more successful at producing 
income in the divorced state, the more likely they are to become divorced.  The result for 
1 ˆ ∆
2 ˆ ∆  
indicates that as female earnings becomes a larger portion of total family income, the likelihood of 
divorce increases.   Interestingly, the idea that the family attaches a positive value to the female’s 
earnings and therefore, attempts to continue the state of marriage fails to overcome the previous 
two arguments.  There may be some validity to this contention, but the positive effect (if present) is 
obviously not large enough to offset either of the other two effects.   
In addition to the two difference variables, the entire series of state dummy variables was included in 
this estimation (they are excluded from the individual income equations) just as it was in the original 
selection probit (although the results do not appear in Table 6).7   The reason for including these 
variables is primarily that the various states have different legal systems and, as mentioned earlier, 
other studies have found that the legal situation does have an important impact on the willingness 
and ability to dissolve a marriage.  Curiously enough, 39 of the 50 estimated coefficients were 
significantly different from zero at the 10% level of significance.8     So, even though the created 
income variables (  and  ) are significant, the geographic dummies retain their importance.   
Finally, even though the structural probit makes use of many fewer variables than the selection 
1 ˆ ∆ 2 ˆ ∆
                                                  
7   The coefficient estimates and t-scores for the state dummy variables are omitted from Table 6 because of concerns for 
space.  Full results will be supplied on request. 
8   Washington, D.C. was included in the estimations as a state and Kansas was excluded.  Thus, 50 coefficients were 
estimated. 
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probit, its pseudo R-squared is almost double that of the selection estimation—0.39 compared to 
0.22.9
                                                  
9   In addition, several other goodness of fit measures all indicate that the “structural” probit provides superior statistical 
results to the estimates produced by the reduced form equation. 
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6 CONCLUSIONS 
 
The estimations reported in this paper tend to confirm arguments that have long been made about 
the causes of divorce.  As females experience greater levels of success in the labour market, they 
also tend to experience higher levels of divorce.  This occurs for two important reasons.  First, 
greater financial independence clearly makes the decision to seek a divorce much simpler.  In this 
respect, developing countries that have concentrated on guaranteeing equal economic status for 
females have reduced the burden of living with unhappy marriages strictly for economic reasons.  
However, it also appears that a female’s economic success may, indeed, cause friction within the 
family.  The results of the estimations in this paper clearly indicate that as the female’s earnings 
become a larger portion of total family income, the likelihood of divorce increases even while 
controlling for general success in the labour market ( 1 ˆ ∆ ).  Of course, over time the causes of this 
effect (fragile male egos?) could well change. 
Finally, there is little doubt that many other contributory factors affect the decision to seek a 
divorce.  This is the reason that the series of state dummy variables was maintained in the final 
probit equation.  As all statisticians know, resorting to the use of binary variables reveals a certain 
degree of ignorance.  In this particular case, that degree of ignorance turned out to be relatively 
important, as thirty-nine of the estimated coefficients for the state dummy variables in the final 
probit were significantly different from zero.  In other words, opportunities still exist in the search 
for a more perfect statistical model of marriage dissolution. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table 1 List of Variables 
Variable Definition 
S_[two letter state code]  Binary: 1 for selected state, 0 otherwise 
(Washington, D.C. is included) 
ED_56  Binary: 1 if highest grade attempted was fifth or sixth, 0 otherwise 
ED_78  Binary: 1 if highest grade attempted was seventh or eighth, 0 otherwise 
ED_9  Binary: 1 if highest grade attempted was ninth, 0 otherwise 
ED_10  Binary: 1 if highest grade attempted was tenth, 0 otherwise 
ED_11  Binary: 1 if highest grade attempted was eleventh, 0 otherwise 
ED_12  Binary: 1 if highest grade attempted was twelfth, 0 otherwise 
ED_Hsgd  Binary: 1 if high school graduate, 0 otherwise 
ED_Univ  Binary: 1 if some college was attempted, 0 otherwise 
ED_BA  Binary: 1 if college graduate, 0 otherwise 
ED_Grad  Binary: 1 if some graduate school was attempted, 0 otherwise 
OC_Exec  Binary: 1 if executive, 0 otherwise 
OC_Prof  Binary: 1 if Professional, 0 otherwise 
OC_Tech  Binary: 1 if Technician, 0 otherwise 
OC_Sales  Binary: 1 if Sales, 0 otherwise 
OC_Clerical  Binary: 1 if Clerical and administrative support, 0 otherwise 
OC_Household  Binary: 1 if Household service worker, 0 otherwise 
OC_Guard  Binary: 1 if Protective service worker, 0 otherwise 
OC_Oservice  Binary: 1 if Other service worker, 0 otherwise 
OC_Craft  Binary: 1 if Craft and repair worker, 0 otherwise 
OC_Machine  Binary: 1 if Machine operator, 0 otherwise 
OC_Transport  Binary: 1 if Transportation and material moving, 0 otherwise 
OC_Equipment  Binary: 1 if Handler, equipment cleaners, etc., 0 otherwise 
OC_Farm  Binary: 1 if Farming, forestry and fishing, 0 otherwise 
IN_Ag  Binary: 1 if Agriculture, 0 otherwise 
IN_Mine  Binary: 1 if Mining, 0 otherwise 
IN_Construction  Binary: 1 if Construction manufacturing, 0 otherwise 
IN_DGS  Binary: 1 if Durable goods manufacturing, 0 otherwise 
IN_NDGS  Binary: 1 if Non Durable goods manufacturing, 0 otherwise 
IN_Trans  Binary: 1 if Transportation, communication and public utilities,  0 otherwise 
IN_Whtr  Binary: 1 if Wholesale trade, 0 otherwise 
IN_Retr  Binary: 1 if Retail trade, 0 otherwise 
IN_Fin  Binary: 1 if Finance, Insurance or Real Estate, 0 otherwise 
IN_Bserv  Binary: 1 if Business and repair services, 0 otherwise 
IN_Pserv  Binary: 1 if Personal services, 0 otherwise 
IN_Ent  Binary: 1 if Entertainment and recreation services, 0 otherwise 
IN_Profs  Binary: 1 if Professional and related services, 0 otherwise 
IN_Padm  Binary: 1 if Public administration, 0 otherwise 
MIG_MM  Binary: 1 if Migrated from MSA to MSA in previous year, 0 otherwise 
MIG_MNON  Binary: 1 if Migrated from MSA to non MSA in previous year, 0 otherwise 
MIG_NONM  Binary: 1 if Migrated from non MSA to MSA in previous year, 0 otherwise 
MIG_NN  Binary: 1 if Migrated from non MSA to non MSA in previous year, 0 
otherwise 
MIG_ABM  Binary: 1 if Migrated from abroad to MSA in previous year, 0 otherwise 
MIG_ABN  Binary: 1 if Migrated from abroad to non MSA in previous year, 0 otherwise 
WC_Fed  Binary: 1 if Worked for federal government, 0 otherwise 
WC_Local  Binary: 1 if Worked for local government, 0 otherwise 
WC_State  Binary: 1 if Worked for state government, 0 otherwise 
LF_Work  Binary: 1 if Working, 0 otherwise 
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LF_Unemp  Binary: 1 if Unemployed but in the labor force, 0 otherwise 
Black  Binary: 1 if African American, 0 otherwise 
Indian  Binary: 1 if American Indian, 0 otherwise 
Asian  Binary: 1 if Asian, 0 otherwise 
Hispanic  Binary: 1 if Hispanic, 0 otherwise 
Age  Age of the individual measured in years 
Under18  Number of children under 18 years of age living with the family 
MSA  Binary: 1 if living in an MSA, 0 otherwise 
Selfemploy  Binary: 1 if Self employed, 0 otherwise 
Homebuy  Binary: 1 if Purchasing the home, 0 otherwise  
Statepcy  Per capita income of the state of residence 
Famsize  Number of people in the family 
1995  Binary: 1 if Observation is from 1995, 0 otherwise 
2000  Binary: 1 if Observation is from 2000, 0 otherwise 
Divorce  Binary: 1 if Divorced, 0 otherwise 
Fincome  Family income measured in constant dollars 
Pincome  Personal income measured in constant 1982-1984 dollars 
 
 
Table 2 Estimation Results for the Probit Selection Equation 
(dependent variable = Divorce) 
Variable Coefficient  t-score 
Constant 0.1509  0.732 
ED_56 -0.1522  -2.324
**
ED_78 0.0642  1.117 
ED_9 0.1505  2.494
**
ED_10 0.1864  3.254
*  
ED_11 0.1403  2.432
**
ED_12 0.1420  2.020
**
ED_Hsgd 0.1072  2.104
**
ED_Univ 0.1847  3.577
*
ED_BA -0.0445  -0.830 
ED_Grad 0.0675  1.206 
MIG_MM 0.0578  3.547
*
MIG_MNON 0.0904  2.004
**
MIG_NONM -0.1364  -2.542
**
MIG_NN 0.2473  8.365
*
MIG_ABM -0.4063  -5.572
*
MIG_ABN -0.5810  -2.192
**
WC_Fed 0.0293  0.720 
WC_Local 0.0138 0.576 
WC_State 0.0801  2.531
**




Black 0.4260  21.769
*
Indian 0.3022  5.695
*
Asian -0.4105  -10.159
*
Hispanic 0.0427  2.158
**
Age 0.0134  27.633
*
Under18 0.7474  92.804
*
MSA 0.1631  10.171
*
Selfemploy -0.2555  -11.475
*
Homebuy -0.5600  -43.586
*
Statepcy -0.0000  -1.185 
Famsize -0.9525  -125.417
*
1995 0.1055  7.305
*
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2000 0.1649  4.895
*
    
n 112,740   
Chi squared 









 *Significant at the 1% level. 
**Significant at the 5% level. 
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Table 3 Estimation Results for the Divorced Personal Income Equation 
(dependent variable = Personal Earnings) 
 
   *Significant at the 1% level. 
Variable Coefficient  t-score 
Constant -5938.062  -3.961
*
ED_56 414.453  0.363 
ED_78 376.520  0.349 
ED_9 -229.585  0.838 
ED_10 -568.008  -0.467 
ED_11 -481.276  -0.434 
ED_12 -173.434  -0.144 
ED_Hsgd 398.550  0.376 
ED_Univ 846.582  0.785 
ED_BA 3840.904  3.595
*
ED_Grad 7318.364  6.680
*
MIG_MM -511.214  -2.705
*
MIG_MNON -880.202  -1.609 
MIG_NONM -1537.966  -2.486
**
MIG_NN -533.094  -1.470 
MIG_ABM 651.284  0.631 
MIG_ABN -219.384  -0.051 
WC_Fed 1994.064  4.281
*
WC_Local -1099.755  -3.716
*
WC_State -960.939  -2.600
*
LF_Work 5402.567  8.594
*
LF_Unemp 1444.790  2.105
**
Black -395.019  -1.534 
Indian -194.288  -0.331 
Asian 611.861  1.140 
Hispanic -443.722  -1.865
***
Age -26.624  -2.883
*
Under18 -1071.602  -3.753
*
MSA 1358.628  6.372
*
Selfemploy -836.517  -2.624
*
Homebuy 2068.368  8.241
*
Statepcy 0.360  11.251
*
Famsize 780.981  2.134
**
1995 224.029  1.290 
2000 27.884  0.149 
Lamda (IMR)  -1423.519  -2.689
*
Rho -0.164   




2 0.471  
 **Significant at the 5% level. 
***Significant at the 5% level. 
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Table 4 Estimation Results for the Married Personal Income Equation 
(dependent variable = Personal Earnings) 
Variable Coefficient  t-score 
Constant -6415.416  -17.545
*
ED_56 -284.100  -0.991 
ED_78 -1.920  -0.007 
ED_9 -238.122  -0.827 
ED_10 -374.250  -1.327 
ED_11 -507.512  -1.832
**
ED_12 -336.782  -0.979 
ED_Hsgd -345.321  -1.423 
ED_Univ 82.323  0.334 
ED_BA 2028.300  8.007
*
ED_Grad 6270.188  23.618
*
MIG_MM -14.550  -0.175 
MIG_MNON -98.368  -0.440 
MIG_NONM -997.990 -3.654
*
MIG_NN -297.523  -1.966
**
MIG_ABM -1112.558  -3.962
*
MIG_ABN 77.786  0.101 
WC_Fed 2428.852  11.379
*
WC_Local -749.226  -6.593
*
WC_State 84.579  0.525 
LF_Work 5197.963  27.379
*
LF_Unemp 1513.559  6.089
*
Black 748.609  6.650
*
Indian 134.426  0.482 
Asian 793.503  5.587
*
Hispanic 13.274  0.149 
Age -11.689  -4.758
*
Under18 -529.507  -10.081
*
MSA 915.309  13.491
*
Selfemploy -931.276  -9.990
*
Homebuy 1277.754  16.798
*
Statepcy 0.300  24.607
*
Famsize 92.319  1.744
**
1995 461.506  7.190
*
2000 679.873  9.799
*
Lamda (IMR)  -621.565  -3.027
*
Rho -0.795   




2 0.484  
 *Significant at the 1% level. 
**Significant at the 5% level. 
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Table 5 Estimation Results for the Married Family Income Equation 
(depedent variable = Family Income) 
Variable Coefficient  t-score 
Constant -21996.904  -10.538
*
ED_56 305.502  0.218
 
ED_78 429.783  0.301 
ED_9 157.097  0.107 
ED_10 98.911  0.058 
ED_11 487.994  0.333 
ED_12 2023.786  1.305 
ED_Hsgd 4495.666  3.138
*
ED_Univ 7822.660  5.430
*
ED_BA 15525.113  10.604
*
ED_Grad 21973.639  14.962
*
MIG_MM -1156.044  -5.255
*
MIG_MNON 384.954  0.659 
MIG_NONM -3809.466  -5.389
*
MIG_NN -1897.787  -4.740
*
MIG_ABM -4557.808  -6.199
*
MIG_ABN 335.830  0.168 
WC_Fed 512.926  0.935 
WC_Local -2357.779  -8.045
*
WC_State -1963.318  -4.740
*
LF_Work 3099.166  6.306
*
LF_Unemp -1434.980  -2.240
**
Black -5554.957  -19.133
*
Indian -3469.821  -4.842
*
Asian 298.584  0.802 
Hispanic -4286.220  -16.786
*
Age -320.324  -40.466
*
Under18 -7449.363  -49.628
*
MSA 4869.148  26.902
*
Selfemploy 2363.281  9.798
*
Homebuy 10163.315  49.171
*
Statepcy 1.118  35.063
*
Famsize 8795.796  49.702
*
1995 -1372.387  -8.270
*
2000 -325.845  -1.832
**
Lamda (IMR)  -8807.076  -14.156
*
Rho -0.434   




2 0.383  
 *Significant at the 1% level. 
**Significant at the 5% level. 
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Table 6 Estimation Results for the Structural Probit 
(dependent variable = Divorce) 
Variable Coefficient  t-score 
Constant -0.10681  -0.913   
1 ˆ ∆   -0.00014 -16.978
*
2 ˆ ∆   -0.00016 -121.822
*
    
n 112,740 
Chi squared 
(goodness of fit) 
54,877.90
*




 *Significant at the 1% level. 
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